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In this paper we investigate such phase-transition-like behavior of quantum games,
by suggesting a method which would help to illuminate the origin of such kind of
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1. Introduction
The theory of quantum games is a new born field which combines the classical
game theory and the quantum information theory, opening a new range of potential
applications. Recent research have shown that quantum games can outperform their
classical counterparts [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. J. Eisert et al. investigated
the quantization of the famous game of Prisoners’ Dilemma [4]. Their result exhibits
the surprising superiority of quantum strategies over classical ones and the players can
escape the dilemma when they both resort to quantum strategies. L. Marinatto and
T. Weber studied the quantum version of the Battle of the Sexes game and found that
the game can have a unique solution with entangled strategy [5]. Besides two player
quantum games, works on multiplayer games have also been presented [6, 7]. In a
recent paper of S.C. Benjamin and P.M. Hayden, they showed that multiplayer quantum
games can exhibit certain forms of pure quantum equilibrium that have no analogue in
classical games, or even in two player quantum games [6]. Although most of the works
are focused on maximally entangled quantum games, game of varying entanglement is
also investigated [9, 10]. For the particular case of the two-player quantum Prisoners’
Dilemma, two thresholds for the game’s entanglement is found, and the phenomena
which are very much like phase transitions are also revealed. Even though quantum
game are played mostly on paper, the first experimental realization of quantum games
has also been implemented on a NMR quantum computer [11].
In this paper, we investigate the phase-transition-like behavior of quantum games,
using a proposed method which would help to illuminate the origin of such kind
of behavior. For the generalized version of Prisoners’ Dilemma, we find that, with
different settings of the numerical values for the payoff table, even though the classical
game behaves the same, the quantum game behaves greatly differently and exhibits
interesting phase-transition-like behavior in the entanglement-payoff diagram. We find
thresholds for the amount of entanglement that separate different regions for the game.
The properties of the game changes discontinuously when its entanglement goes across
these thresholds, creating the phase-transition-like behavior. We present investigation
for both the case where the strategic space is restricted as in Ref. [4] and the case
where the players are allowed to adopt any unitary operations as their strategies. In the
case where the strategic space is restricted, the phase-transition-like behavior exhibits
interesting variation with respect to the change of the numerical values in the payoff
table, so does the property of the game. In the case where the players are allowed
to adopt any unitary operations, the game has an boundary, being a function of the
numerical values in the payoff table, for its entanglement. The quantum game has an
infinite number of Nash equilibria if its entanglement is below the boundary, otherwise
no pure strategic Nash equilibrium could be found when its entanglement exceeds the
boundary.
The proposed method would help to illuminate the origin of such kind of phase-
transition-like behavior. In this method, strategies of players are corresponding to unit
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Figure 1. The physical model for two player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma.
vectors in some real space, and the searching for Nash equilibria includes a procedure of
finding the eigenvector of some matrix that corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue. In
the particular case presented in this paper, the eigenvalues are functions of the amount
of entanglement, and thus there can be an eigenvalue-crossing. Crossing an eigenvalue-
crossing point makes the eigenvector that corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue changes
discontinuously, indicating the discontinuous change of the properties of the quantum
game, as well as the phase-transition-like behavior.
2. Quantization of The Generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma
The classical Prisoners’ Dilemma is the most widely studied and used paradigm as a
non-zero-sum game that could have an equilibrium outcome which is unique, but fails
to be Pareto optimal. The importance of this game lies in the fact that many social
phenomena with which we are familiar seem to have Prisoner’s Dilemma at their core.
The general form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma [12] is shown as in Table 1, with suggestive
names for the strategies and payoffs. The condition t > r > p > s guarantees that
strategy D dominates strategy C for both players, and that the unique equilibrium at
(D,D) is Pareto inferior to (C,C).
The physical model of the quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma is originally proposed by J.
Eisert et al. as shown in Fig. 1. Together with the payoff table for the general Prisoners’
Dilemma, the scheme can represent the generalized quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma. In
this scheme the game has two qubits, one for each player. The possible outcomes of
the classical strategies D and C are assigned to two basis |D〉 and |C〉 in the Hilbert
space of a qubit. Hence the state of the game at each instance is described by a vector
in the tensor product space which is spanned by the classical game basis |CC〉, |CD〉,
Table 1. The general form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The first entry in the
parenthesis denotes the payoff of Alice and the second number the payoff of Bob.
The entries in this table should satisfy conditions: t > r > p > s (see in Reference
[12]). The meanings of the symbols in the table is as follows. C: Cooperate; D: Defect;
r: reward; p: punishment; t: temptation; s: sucker’s payoff.
Bob: C Bob: D
Alice: C (r, r) (s, t)
Alice: D (t, s) (p, p)
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|DC〉 and |DD〉, where the first and second entries refer to Alice’s and Bob’s qubits
respectively. The initial state of the game is given by
|ψi〉 = Jˆ |CC〉 , (1)
where Jˆ is a unitary operator which is known to both players. Strategic moves of Alice
and Bob are associated with unitary operators UˆA and UˆB respectively, which are chosen
from a strategic space S. At the final stage, the state of the game is
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ
†
(
UˆA ⊗ UˆB
)
Jˆ |CC〉 . (2)
The subsequent measurement yields a particular result and the expect payoffs of the
players are given by{
$A = rPCC + pPDD + tPDC + sPCD
$B = rPCC + pPDD + sPDC + tPCD
, (3)
where Pστ = |〈στ | ψf 〉|
2 (σ, τ ∈ {C,D}) is the probability that |ψf 〉 collapses into basis
|στ〉.
In the general case, strategies for players could be any unitary operations. However,
since the overall phase factor of |ψf 〉 will not affect the final results of the game, we
can safely set the strategic space S = SU (2) as in Refs. [4] and [6], without loss of
generality.
As we known, an operator Uˆ ∈ SU (2) can be written as
Uˆ = w · Iˆ2 + x · iσˆx + y · iσˆy + z · iσˆz, (4)
with w, x, y, z ∈ [−1, 1] and w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 1. This enables us to represent Uˆ
directly by a four-dimensional real vector
u = (w, x, y, z) ∈ R4, (5)
with u·uT = w2+x2+y2+z2 = 1 (superscript T denotes Transpose), and its components
are denoted as u1 = w, u2 = x, u3 = y, u4 = z.
Denote Alice’s strategy by uA and Bob’s by uB, the payoffs in Eq. (3) can be
written as {
$A = $A (uA, uB) =
∑
ij,kl $
A
ij,kl · u
i
Au
j
Au
k
Bu
l
B
$B = $B (uA, uB) =
∑
ij,kl $
B
ij,kl · u
i
Bu
j
Bu
k
Au
l
A
, (6)
where i, j, k, l run from 1 to 4,
(
$Aij,kl
)
and
(
$Bij,kl
)
are certain tensors. The formulation of(
$Aij,kl
)
and
(
$Bij,kl
)
in Eq. (6) are not uniquely determined. However if restricted to be
symmetric, i.e. $Aij,kl = $
A
ji,kl = $
A
ij,lk and $
B
ij,kl = $
B
ji,kl = $
B
ij,lk (this can always be done),
they both can be uniquely determined. The calculations for
(
$Aij,kl
)
and
(
$Bij,kl
)
could
be found in Appendix A. Eqs. (6) are actually very general formulations for any static
quantum game expressed as in Table 1 and Fig. 1 (the gate Jˆ† prior to measurement
can even be replaced by other unitary transformation, not necessarily the inverse of
Jˆ). All the structural information of the game, including the classical payoff table and
the physical model, is represented by the tensors
(
$Aij,kl
)
and
(
$Bij,kl
)
. In the Prisoners’
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Dilemma, we have $Aij,kl ≡ $
B
ij,kl due to the symmetric structure of the game. In an
asymmetric game,
(
$Aij,kl
)
does not necessarily equals
(
$Bij,kl
)
.
Defining $ij,kl ≡ $
A
ij,kl ≡ $
B
ij,kl, Eq. (6) can be re-expressed as{
$A (uA, uB) =
∑
ij
(∑
kl $ij,kl · u
k
Bu
l
B
)
uiAu
j
A = uA · P (uB) · u
T
A
$B (uA, uB) =
∑
ij
(∑
kl $ij,kl · u
k
Au
l
A
)
uiBu
j
B = uB · P (uA) · u
T
B
, (7)
where P (u) is a symmetric matrix as a function of u, whose i, j-th element satisfies
(P (u))ij =
∑
kl
$ij,kl · u
kul. (8)
Let (u∗A, u
∗
B) be a Nash equilibrium of the game, we can see that, from Eq. (7),
uA · P (u
∗
B) · u
T
A reaches its maximum at uA = u
∗
A and simultaneously uB · P (u
∗
A) · u
T
B
reaches its maximum at uB = u
∗
B. In terms of game theory, we say that u
∗
A dominates u
∗
B
and u∗B dominates u
∗
A. Together with u
∗
A · (u
∗
A)
T = u∗B · (u
∗
B)
T = 1, we can conclude that
u∗A (u
∗
B) must be the eigenvector of P (u
∗
B) [P (u
∗
A)] which corresponds to the maximal
eigenvalue, and the corresponding eigenvalue is exactly the payoff for Alice (Bob) at this
Nash equilibrium. This analysis also tells that the dominant strategy against a given
strategy u must be the eigenvector of P (u) that corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue.
In the following, we will first investigate the general Prisoners’ Dilemma in the case
that the strategic space is restricted to be the 2-parameter subset of SU (2) as given
in Ref. [4]. Then we investigate this game when the players are allowed to adopt any
unitary strategic operations. Here we shall note that some authors [15] have argued
that the restriction on the strategic space given in Ref. [4] has no physical basis, and it
does restrict generality. However, apart from these arguments, it is still an interesting
case and a good instance to show how the phase-transition-like behavior originates. Yet
the particular results achieved hold only for this very specific set of strategies.
3. Two-Parameter Set of Strategies
In the case of two-parameter set of strategies, the strategic space S is restricted to the
two-parameter subset of SU (2) as follows [4],
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) =
(
eiϕ cos θ/2 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 e−iϕ cos θ/2
)
, (9)
with θ ∈ [0, π] and ϕ ∈ [0, π/2].
As illustrated in details by J. Eisert et al. [4], in order to guarantee that the classical
Prisoners’ Dilemma is faithfully represented, the form of Jˆ should be
Jˆ = eiγDˆ⊗Dˆ/2 = cos
γ
2
Cˆ ⊗ Cˆ + i sin
γ
2
Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, (10)
where Cˆ = Uˆ (0, 0), Dˆ = Uˆ (π, 0), and γ ∈ [0, π/2] is in fact a measure for the game’s
entanglement.
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Eq. (9) can be rewritten as
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) = cos
θ
2
cosϕ · Iˆ2 + sin
θ
2
· iσˆy + cos
θ
2
sinϕ · iσˆz
= w · Iˆ2 + y · iσˆy + z · iσˆz, (11)
where w = cos θ
2
cosϕ, y = sin θ
2
, z = cos θ
2
sinϕ. Obviously we have w, y, z ∈ [0, 1]
and Uˆ (θ, ϕ) ∈ SU (2) implies that w2 + y2 + z2 = 1. Since Uˆ (θ, ϕ) and −Uˆ (θ, ϕ)
represent the same strategy, it is enough to restrict ourselves with w, y, z ∈ [−1, 1].
Therefore in the case of two-parameter set of strategies, Uˆ (θ, ϕ) can be represented by
a three-dimensional real vector
u = (w, y, z) ∈ R3, (12)
with u · uT = w2 + y2 + z2 = 1. Eqs. (6, 7, 8) will remain their form, except that
all the indices run only from 1 to 3, rather than from 1 to 4. Obviously we have
Cˆ ∼ (1, 0, 0) , Dˆ ∼ (0, 1, 0) , Qˆ ∼ (0, 0, 1), in which “∼” means “represent (by)”. In
the remaining part of this paper, we do not distinguish a unitary operator and the
corresponding vector (3-dimensional or 4-dimensional), as long as there is not ambiguity.
In Ref. [9], we investigated this game in the case that (r, p, t, s) = (3, 1, 5, 0) and
observed the phenomenon that are very much like phase transitions. In the generalized
quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma, such phase-transition-like behavior still exists. In fact,
there exist two thresholds for the game’s entanglement, γth1 = arcsin
√
(p− s) / (t− s)
and γth2 = arcsin
√
(t− r) / (t− s). We hereby prove that, for 0 6 γ < γth1, the
strategic profile Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ is the Nash equilibrium with payoffs $A = $B = p. For
γth2 < γ 6 π/2, the strategic profile Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ is the Nash equilibrium with payoffs
$A = $B = r. If γth1 < γth2 and γth1 6 γ 6 γth2, the game has two Nash equilibria
Dˆ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ⊗ Dˆ. The payoff for the player who adopts Dˆ is s+(t− s) cos2 γ while for
the player who adopts Qˆ is s + (t− s) sin 2γ. While if γth2 < γth1 and γth2 6 γ 6 γth1,
both Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ and Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ are Nash equilibria of the game. We obtain these conclusions
through the following steps:
Assume one player adopts strategy Dˆ, the payoff for the other as the function of
his/her strategy u is
u · P
(
Dˆ
)
· uT , (13)
where the explicit expression of P
(
Dˆ
)
is (the calculation could be found in Appendix B)
P
(
Dˆ
)
=

 s 0 00 p 0
0 0 s+ (t− s) sin 2γ

 . (14)
If 0 6 γ < γth1 = arcsin
√
(p− s) / (t− s), the maximal eigenvalue of P
(
Dˆ
)
is
p, and the corresponding eigenvector is (0, 1, 0) ∼ Dˆ. If γth1 < γ 6 π/2, the
maximal eigenvalue of P
(
Dˆ
)
is s + (t− s) sin 2γ, and the corresponding eigenvector
is (0, 0, 1) ∼ Qˆ. Therefore Dˆ dominates Dˆ for 0 6 γ < γth1 while Qˆ dominates Dˆ
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Figure 2. The payoff function of Alice with respect to the amount of the entanglement
in the case of two-parameter strategies. The numerical values in the payoff matrix are
set as (r = 3, p = 1, t = 5, s = 0) such that r + p < t + s. The region between two
thresholds are the transitional region from classical to quantum, in which the game
has two asymmetric Nash equilibria although the game is symmetric with respect to
the interchange of the players.
for γth1 < γ 6 π/2. For the same time we have $A
(
Dˆ, Dˆ
)
= $B
(
Dˆ, Dˆ
)
= p and
$A
(
Qˆ, Dˆ
)
= $B
(
Dˆ, Qˆ
)
= s+ (t− s) sin 2γ.
While assume one player adopts strategy Qˆ, the payoff for the other as the function
of his/her strategy u is
u · P
(
Qˆ
)
· uT , (15)
where the explicit expression of P
(
Qˆ
)
is (the calculation could be found in Appendix B)
P
(
Qˆ
)
=

 r − (r − p) sin
2γ 0 0
0 t− (t− s) sin 2γ 0
0 0 r

 . (16)
If 0 6 γ < γth2 = arcsin
√
(t− r) / (t− s), the maximal eigenvalue of P
(
Qˆ
)
is
t− (t− s) sin 2γ, and the corresponding eigenvector is (0, 1, 0) ∼ Dˆ. If γth2 < γ 6 π/2,
the maximal eigenvalue of P
(
Qˆ
)
is r, and the corresponding eigenvector is (0, 0, 1) ∼ Qˆ.
Therefore Dˆ dominates Qˆ for 0 6 γ < γth2 while Qˆ dominates Qˆ for γth2 < γ 6 π/2.
For the same time we have $A
(
Qˆ, Qˆ
)
= $B
(
Qˆ, Qˆ
)
= r and $A
(
Dˆ, Qˆ
)
= $B
(
Qˆ, Dˆ
)
=
t− (t− s) sin 2γ = s + (t− s) cos2 γ.
From the above analysis, we can see that when 0 6 γ < γth1, Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ is a Nash
equilibrium of the game, and when γth2 < γ 6 π/2, Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ is a Nash equilibrium of
the game. If γth1 < γth2 and γth1 6 γ 6 γth2, Dˆ dominates Qˆ and Qˆ dominates Dˆ,
hence both Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ ⊗ Dˆ are Nash equilibria of the game. While if γth2 < γth1
and γth2 6 γ 6 γth1, both Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ and Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ are Nash equilibria of the game. The
corresponding payoffs are also obtained.
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In the case that the entries in the payoff table are taken as (r = 3, p = 1, t = 5, s = 0),
which has been investigated in Ref[9], the game has two thresholds for the amount of the
game’s entanglement. Due to the two thresholds, the game is divided into three regions,
the classical region, the quantum region, and the transitional region from classical to
quantum. In the general quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma, there still exist two thresholds
and the phase-transition-like behavior shows up again. However the situation may be
more complicated because the two thresholds have no deterministic relations in magni-
tude. In fact, the case that (r = 3, p = 1, t = 5, s = 0) is just an instance of the more
general case of r + p < t + s. For the game under this condition, it is obviously that
γth1 < γth2 and the game behaves similarly to the one with (r = 3, p = 1, t = 5, s = 0).
Fig. 2 depicts the payoff of Alice as the function of γ when both players resort to Nash
equilibrium in the case of r + p < t + s. In the transitional regions, the two Nash
equilibria are fully equivalent. Since there is no communication between two players,
one player will have no idea which equilibrium strategy the other player chooses. So the
strategy mismatch situation will probably occur. A more severe problem is that, since
strategy Dˆ will lead to a better payoff so both players will be tempted to choose Dˆ and
the final payoff for both of them will become p, which happens to be the catch of the
dilemma in the classical game.
An interesting situation is, as we can see, if γth1 = γth2, the transitional region will
disappear. The condition γth1 = γth2 implies that
r + p = t+ s. (17)
Note that we should keep in mind that the basic condition t > r > p > s must be
satisfied to maintain the properties of the classical game. And under the condition in
Eq. (17) the game has only one threshold for its entanglement γth = γth1 = γth2. Hence
the game exhibits only two regions, one is classical and the other is quantum. The
transitional region in which the game has two asymmetric Nash equilibrium disappears.
Under the conditions r+ p = t+ s and t > r > p > s, we plot the payoff of Alice as the
function of γ in Fig. 3 when both players resort to Nash equilibrium.
Now we consider what would happen in the game of r+ p > t+ s. In this case, we
have γth1 > γth2. Therefore the game has no transitional region, hence none of Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ
and Qˆ⊗ Dˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the game. However both Dˆ⊗ Dˆ and Qˆ⊗ Qˆ are still
Nash equilibria in the region γth2 6 γ 6 γth1. So for γth2 6 γ 6 γth1, a new region —
coexistent region — arises with two Nash equilibria. These two Nash equilibria are both
symmetric with respect to the interchange of the two players. In this case, we illustrate
the payoff of Alice as the function of γ in Fig. 4. We should also note that in this
case the multiple Nash equilibria brings a situation different to that in the transitional
regions with r + p < t + s. The two Nash equilibria are not equivalent and Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ
gives higher payoffs to both players than does Dˆ⊗ Dˆ. Therefore it is a quite reasonable
assumption that the players are most likely to resort to the equilibrium Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ rather
than Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, since they are both trying to maximize their individual payoffs. However,
one still can not claim that the players will definitely resort to the equilibrium that gives
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Figure 3. The payoff function of Alice with respect to the amount of the entanglement
in the case of two-parameter strategies. The numerical values in the payoff matrix are
set as (r = 3, p = 2, t = 5, s = 0) such that r+ p = t+ s. The two thresholds converge
to be a unique one γth and the transitional region no longer exists.
Figure 4. The payoff function of Alice with respect to the amount of the entanglement
in the case of two-parameter strategies. The numerical values in the payoff matrix are
set as (r = 3, p = 2, t = 4, s = 0) such that r + p > t + s. The coexistent region
emerges, in which both Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ and Qˆ⊗ Qˆ are Nash equilibria.
higher payoffs. But if they do, the final results of the game will then be the same as in
the quantum region with γ > γth1, and the dilemma will be resolved.
An interesting question is that can the game behave full quantum-mechanically
no matter how much it is entangled for some particular numerical value of (r, p, t, s),
i.e. have only the quantum region (without the presence of classical, transitional or
coexistent regions). If it can, we immediately deduce that γth2 = 0. This means t = r,
which contradicts the basic condition t > r > p > s. Hence the game cannot always
have Qˆ⊗Qˆ as its equilibrium in the whole domain of γ from 0 to π/2, as long as the game
remains a “Prisoners’ Dilemma”. In fact, as long as the condition t > r > p > s holds,
none of γth1 and γth2 could reach 0 or π/2, hence none of the classical and quantum
regions will disappear.
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4. General Unitary Operations
In this section, we investigate the generalized quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma when both
the players can access to any unitary operations as their strategies, rather than in a
restricted subset in Eq. (9). The method for analyzing is clearly described in section
2. The result is that, there exist a boundary γB = arcsin
√
(p− s) / (p+ t− r − s) for
the game’s entanglement. If γ < γB, there are infinite Nash equilibrium. Any strategic
profile {(0, α, β, 0) , (0, β, α, 0)} (α2 + β2 = 1) is a Nash equilibrium. Each of them
results in the same payoffs $A = $B = p+ (r − p) sin
2 γ. While as long as γ > γB, there
will be no Nash equilibrium for the game. We prove these results as follows.
For the strategy u1 = (0, α, β, 0) (α
2 + β2 = 1), we have (the calculation could be
found in Appendix A), with ǫ ≡ sin2 γ,
P (u1) =


s+ (t− s)α2ǫ 0 0 (s− t)αβǫ
0 p+ (r − p) β2ǫ (r − p)αβǫ 0
0 (r − p)αβǫ p+ (r − p)α2ǫ 0
(s− t)αβǫ 0 0 s+ (t− s)β2ǫ

 . (18)
The eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors of P ((0, α, β, 0)) in Eq. (18) are

p (0, α,−β, 0)
s (β, 0, 0, α)
p + (r − p) sin2 γ (0, β, α, 0)
s + (t− s) sin2 γ (α, 0, 0,−β)
. (19)
If γ < γB, the maximal eigenvalue is p+(r − p) sin
2 γ and the corresponding eigenvector
is (0, β, α, 0). Therefore (0, β, α, 0) dominates (0, α, β, 0), and vice versa (by exchanging
α and β in Eqs. (18, 19)). Hence any strategic profile {(0, α, β, 0) , (0, β, α, 0)}
(α2 + β2 = 1) is a Nash equilibrium.
While if γ > γB, the dominant strategy against (0, α, β, 0) turns to be (α, 0, 0,−β).
For the strategy u2 = (α, 0, 0,−β), we have (the calculation could be found in
Appendix A), with ǫ ≡ sin2 γ,
P (u2) =


r + (p− r)β2ǫ 0 0 (r − p)αβǫ
0 t+ (s− t)α2ǫ (s− t)αβǫ 0
0 (s− t)αβǫ t + (s− t) β2ǫ 0
(r − p)αβǫ 0 0 r + (p− r)α2ǫ

 . (20)
And the eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors of P ((α, 0, 0,−β)) in Eq. (20) are

r (α, 0, 0, β)
t (0, β,−α, 0)
r + (p− r) sin2 γ (β, 0, 0,−α)
t + (s− t) sin2 γ (0, α, β, 0)
. (21)
In Eq. (21), (0, β,−α, 0) always corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue t. Therefore no
matter what the amount of entanglement is, (0, β,−α, 0) always dominates (α, 0, 0,−β).
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Figure 5. The payoff function of Alice with respect to the amount of the entanglement
in the case that both players are allowed to adopt any unitary operator as his/her
strategy.
With further analysis combining Eq. (19) and Eq. (21), we find that when γ >
γB, (α, 0, 0,−β) dominates (0, α, β, 0), (0, β,−α, 0) dominates (α, 0, 0,−β), (β, 0, 0, α)
dominates (0, β,−α, 0), and finally (0, α, β, 0) dominates (β, 0, 0, α). No pair of them
can form a Nash equilibrium. In fact, it can be proved that no pair of strategies in the
region of γ > γB can form a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. However the game
remains to have mixed Nash equilibria [14].
We depict the payoff function of Alice as a function of the amount of entanglement
when both players resort to Nash equilibrium (if there is one) in Fig. 5. This figure also
exhibits the phase-transition-like behavior of the game. The boundary of entanglement
divides the game into two regions: in one of which the game has infinite Nash equilibria,
while in the other the game has no pure strategic Nash equilibrium.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the discontinuous dependence of Nash equilibria and
payoffs on the game’s entanglement for the general quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma.
This discontinuity can be viewed as the phase-transition-like behavior in the payoff-
entanglement diagram. We firstly investigate the generalized quantum Prisoners’
Dilemma when the strategic space is restricted to be a two-parameter subset of SU (2)
as in Ref. [4]. With condition r + p < t + s, the game exhibits the classical, quantum
and transitional regions in its payoff-entanglement diagram. The original Prisoners’
Dilemma with (r = 3, p = 1, t = 5, s = 0) is just an instance for the general game with
condition r+p < t+s. In the classical region Dˆ⊗Dˆ is the unique Nash equilibrium, and
in the quantum region the unique Nash equilibrium is Qˆ⊗ Qˆ. While in the transitional
region, two asymmetric Nash equilibria, Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ ⊗ Dˆ, emerge, each leads to
the asymmetric result of the game in despite of the symmetry of the game itself. If the
entries in the payoff table satisfy that r+p = t+s, the transitional region will disappear.
The game has only one threshold for the amount of its entanglement at which the game
transits from classical to quantum discontinuously. In the case that r + p > t + s, a
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new region — the coexistent region — emerges, replacing the transitional region. This
new region is in fact there where the classical region and the quantum region overlap.
In the coexistent region, the game has both Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ and Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ as its Nash equilibria.
Since Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ is superior to Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, one may expect both players most likely to choose
Qˆ as his/her strategy, and the dilemma will be resolved if they do so. We also explored
the phase-transition-like behavior of the quantum game in the case where both players
are allowed to adopt any unitary transformations as their strategies. The game has an
boundary for its entanglement, being a function of the numerical values in the payoff
table, below which the game has infinite Nash equilibria, while above which the game
has no pure strategic Nash equilibrium.
The phase-transition-like behavior presented in this paper is very much like phase
transitions in real physical systems [13], not only phenomenally but also mathematically.
For a certain physical system whose Hamiltonian is dependent of some parameter, a
special case is that the eigenfunctions of the Hamiltonian is independent of the parameter
even though the eigenvalues vary with it. Then there can be a level-crossing where
an excited level becomes the ground state, creating a point of a non-analyticity of the
ground state energy as a function of the parameter, as well as a discontinuous dependence
of the ground state on the parameter. A quantum phase transition is hence viewed as
any point of non-analyticity in the ground state energy of the system concerned. In
the generalized quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma, the dominant strategy against a given
strategy u is the eigenvector that corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue of matrix
P (u) (see in Section 2). Since P (u) is a function of the amount of entanglement γ, the
eigenvalues may cross. This eigenvalue-crossing makes the eigenvector that corresponds
to the maximal eigenvalue changes discontinuously. It also creates a non-analyticity of
the payoff (the maximal eigenvalue) as a function of γ, and the game exhibit phase-
transition-like behavior. The method proposed in this paper would help to illuminate
the origin of the phase-transition-like behavior of quantum games, and we hope it would
further help investigate quantum games more intensively, and more profound results may
be derived.
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Appendix A. Calculations For General Unitary Operations
Denote Alice’s strategy by uA = (u
1
A, u
2
A, u
3
A, u
4
A) and Bob’s by uB = (u
1
B, u
2
B, u
3
B, u
4
B),
then substitute Eq. (4) into Eq. (2), we have
|ψf 〉 = [
(
u1Au
1
B − u
4
Au
4
B
)
+ i
(
u4Au
1
B + u
1
Au
4
B
)
cos γ −
(
u3Au
2
B + u
2
Au
3
B
)
sin γ] |CC〉+
[−
(
u1Au
3
B + u
4
Au
2
B
)
+ i
(
u1Au
2
B − u
4
Au
3
B
)
cos γ +
(
u3Au
4
B − u
2
Au
1
B
)
sin γ] |CD〉+
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[−
(
u3Au
1
B + u
2
Au
4
B
)
+ i
(
u2Au
1
B − u
3
Au
4
B
)
cos γ +
(
u4Au
3
B − u
1
Au
2
B
)
sin γ] |DC〉+
[
(
u3Au
3
B − u
2
Au
2
B
)
− i
(
u3Au
2
B + u
2
Au
3
B
)
cos γ +
(
u4Au
1
B + u
1
Au
4
B
)
sin γ] |DD〉 . (A.1)
Since the game is symmetric with respect to the interchange of the players, we have
$A (uA, uB) ≡ $B (uB, uA) , ∀uA, uB ∈ SU (2) . (A.2)
and we can immediately see from Eq. (6) that
$Aij,kl ≡ $
B
ij,kl, i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. (A.3)
And P (u) (in Eq. (8)) is symmetric too. Therefore we can define $ij,kl ≡ $
A
ij,kl ≡ $
B
ij,kl
for convenience. Substitute Eq. (A.1) into Eqs. (3, 6), we can find the non-zero elements
of ($ij,kl) are (with $ij,kl = $ji,kl = $ij,lk = $ji,lk)
$11,11 = $44,44 = r, $11,33 = $44,22 = s,
$22,22 = $33,33 = p, $22,44 = $33,11 = t,
$11,22 = $44,33 = s+ (t− s) sin
2 γ, $11,44 = $44,11 = r + (p− r) sin
2 γ,
$22,11 = $33,44 = t+ (s− t) sin
2 γ, $22,33 = $33,22 = p+ (r − p) sin
2 γ,
$12,13 = −$34,24 =
1
2
(s− r) sin γ, $12,24 = −$34,13 =
1
2
(t− p) sin γ,
$13,12 = −$24,34 =
1
2
(t− r) sin γ, $13,34 = −$24,12 =
1
2
(p− s) sin γ,
$14,14 = −$23,23 =
1
2
(p− r) sin2 γ, $14,23 = −$23,14 =
1
2
(s− t) sin2 γ. (A.4)
For strategy (0, α, β, 0), we see that
(P ((0, α, β, 0)))ij = (P ((0, α, β, 0)))ji
= α2$ij,22 + β
2$ij,33 + αβ ($ij,23 + $ij,32)
= α2$ij,22 + β
2$ij,33 + 2αβ$ij,23 (A.5)
and for (α, 0, 0,−β) we have
(P ((α, 0, 0,−β)))ij = (P ((α, 0, 0,−β)))ji
= α2$ij,11 + β
2$ij,44 − αβ ($ij,14 + $ij,41)
= α2$ij,11 + β
2$ij,44 − 2αβ$ij,14. (A.6)
Therefore Eq. (18) and (20) are obtained.
Appendix B. Calculations For Two-Parameter Strategic Space
The two-parameter strategic space can be obtained by restricting u2 = x ≡ 0 in the
general case (u2 = x is the second component of u, not its squared length). Therefore
the expressions for $ij,kl can be obtained from Eqs. (A.4), by excluding all elements
containing the index 2, and then replacing index 3 by 2 and 4 by 3. Therefore for
the case of two-parameter strategic space, we have all the non-zero elements (with
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$ij,kl = $ji,kl = $ij,lk = $ji,lk) as follows.
$11,11 = $33,33 = r, $11,22 = s, $22,22 = p, $22,11 = t,
$33,22 = s+ (t− s) sin
2 γ, $11,33 = $33,11 = r + (p− r) sin
2 γ,
$22,33 = t+ (s− t) sin
2 γ, $13,13 =
1
2
(p− r) sin2 γ,
$23,12 =
1
2
(p− t) sin γ, $12,23 =
1
2
(p− s) sin γ. (B.1)
Since Dˆ ∼ (0, 1, 0) and Qˆ ∼ (0, 0, 1), it is obvious to see that(
P
(
Dˆ
))
ij
=
(
P
(
Dˆ
))
ji
= $ij,22, (B.2)(
P
(
Qˆ
))
ij
=
(
P
(
Qˆ
))
ji
= $ij,33, (B.3)
with i, j = 1, 2, 3. The expressions in Eqs. (14) and (16) are hence obtained.
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